政府投资项目中政府业主对承包商的激励机制研究——基于多任务委托-代理模型的分析

政府投资项目在质量目标、预算目标和进度目标相对独立和相互依存条件下的激励机制是一个值得研究的问题。当多项任务努力的激励成本相互独立时,最优报酬系数也相互独立,并且最优报酬系数是绝对风险规避率、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的减函数。基于多任务委托-代理模型,可以考虑采用政府业主与承包商之间的最优激励契约。

On the Incentive Mechanism in Government Investment Projects

Based on multi-task principal-agent model,the paper designs the optimal incentive contract between government owners and contractors,and analyzes the corresponding measures under the preconditions of relative autonomy and dependence between quality objective,budget and schedule objectives.When the incentive costs of tasks are mutually independent,the optimal payment coefficient will also be mutually independent and be the decreasing function of absolute risk aversion,rate change of marginal incentive costs,and observable variable variance.