Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals |
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Authors: | Viktoriya Semeshenko Alexis Garapin Bernard Ruffieux Mirta B. Gordon |
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Affiliation: | (1) Laboratory of Economics and Management, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Piazza Martiri della Libert?, 33, 56127 Pisa, Italy;(2) Department of Law and Management, University of Perugia, Via Pascoli, 20, 06123 Perugia, Italy |
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Abstract: | We study experimentally a coordination game with N heterogeneous individuals under different information treatments. We explore the effects of information on the emergence of Pareto-efficient outcomes, by means of a gradual decrease of the information content provided to the players in successive experiments. We observe that successful coordination is possible with private information alone, although not on a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Reinforcement-based learning models reproduce the qualitative trends of the experimental results. |
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