| 工程建设监理激励机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 王树东,刘兵,袁敏. 工程建设监理激励机制设计[J]. 河北工业大学学报:社会科学..., 2010, 0(3): 83-86 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王树东 刘兵 袁敏 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]唐山市建筑工程施工安全监督站,唐山063000 [2]河北工业大学管理学院,天津300401 |
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| 基金项目： | 河北省交通厅科技计划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文考虑工程投资规模,将监理的能力水平、努力程度、外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素引入委托代理理论模型,通过模型分析工程监理的最优激励系数,从而增加激励效用,提高监理工作积极性,更有效地降低道德风险的发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 工程建设监理 激励机制 委托代理 道德风险 |
Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Construction Supervision |
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| WANG Shu-dong,LIU Bing,YUAN Min. Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Construction Supervision[J]. Journal of Hebei University of Technology(Social Science Edition, 2010, 0(3): 83-86 |
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| Authors: | WANG Shu-dong LIU Bing YUAN Min |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Constructional Engineering Safety Supervision Centre in Tangshan,Tangshan 063000,China; 2.School of Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China) |
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| Abstract: | Taking the scale of projects investment into account,this paper introduces the level of supervision competence,the degree of effort and their impact factors into the principal-agent theory.By analyzing the optimal project supervision incentive coefficient,the incentives are turned to be more effective,the supervisors take more initiatives and moral misconducts are reduced. |
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| Keywords: | construction supervision incentive mechanism principal-agent moral misconduct |
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