BANK COMPETITION AND CONSUMER SEARCH OVER CREDIT CARD INTEREST RATES |
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| Authors: | Taehyung Kim Lucia F Dunn Gene E Mumy |
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| Institution: | Kim:;Assistant Vice President, Wachovia Corporation, Charlotte, NC 28288. Phone 1-704-715-4280, Fax 1-704-383-7050, Email Dunn:;Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. Phone 1-614-292-8071, Fax 1-614-292-3906, Email Mumy:;Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. Phone 1-614-292-0376, Fax 1-614-292-3906, Email |
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| Abstract: | This article models bank competition facing consumers with different search incentives and finds that consumers with higher credit card balances have lower interest rates given their risk class due to their greater search effort. It also finds that a default history leads to higher interest rates. The equilibrium interest rate corresponding to risk type and motive (borrowing versus convenience/transactions) is derived theoretically, and the determinants of the interest rate are estimated using an original data set. Endogeneity of default is handled with a two-equation system.(JEL D14 , D12 , D11 ) |
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