One-reason decision-making: Modeling violations of expected utility theory |
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Authors: | Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos Gerd Gigerenzer |
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Affiliation: | (1) Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany |
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Abstract: | People violate expected utility theory and this has been traditionally modeled by augmenting its weight-and-add framework by nonlinear transformations of values and probabilities. Yet individuals often use one-reason decision-making when making court decisions or choosing cellular phones, and institutions do the same when creating rules for traffic safety or fair play in sports. We analyze a model of one-reason decision-making, the priority heuristic, and show that it simultaneously implies common consequence effects, common ratio effects, reflection effects, and the fourfold pattern of risk attitude. The preferences represented by the priority heuristic satisfy some standard axioms. This work may provide the basis for a new look at bounded rationality. |
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Keywords: | Decision making EVT EUT St. Petersburg Paradox |
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