The Budget-Voting Paradox |
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| Authors: | Gilbert Laffond Jean Lainé |
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| Institution: | (1) Laboratoire d’économétrie, Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, 2, rue Conté, F-75003 Paris, France;(2) Ecole Nationale de la Statistique, et de l’Analyse de l’Information, Rennes, and CREM, University of Caen, Caen, France;(3) Department of Economics, ENSAI, Campus de Ker Lann, rue Blaise Pascal, F-35170 Bruz, France |
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| Abstract: | The budget-voting paradox states that, when social alternatives are proper subsets of a finite set of decisions, choosing
decision-wise according to the majority rule may select an alternative that is covered in the majority tournament among alternatives.
Individual preferences are defined on single decisions, and are extended to preferences over the alternative set by means
of a preference extension rule. We prove the existence of the paradox for any rank-based, monotone, and independent extension
rule.
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| Keywords: | majority rule voting paradox subsets preference extension rule |
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