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公司治理的政府介入结构分析
引用本文:向锐,曹国华,杨秀苔.公司治理的政府介入结构分析[J].中国管理科学,2001,9(2):65-70.
作者姓名:向锐  曹国华  杨秀苔
作者单位:重庆大学工商管理学院, 四川重庆400044
摘    要:针对当前我国股份公司治理机制的现状,本文构造了一个相应的模型,应用博弈论方法证明,政府过度介入公司治理将严重影响公司运行效率,认为国有资产应当尽快退出产业部门,以此消除国有企业改革的产权障碍,并且指出这应是当前最为急迫的一项任务。

关 键 词:公司治理  代理问题  博弈分析  
文章编号:1003-207(2001)02-0065-06
收稿时间:2000-03-21;
修稿时间:2000年3月21日

An Analysis of Government Involvement in Corporate Governance Mechanisms
XIANG Rui,CHAO Guo-hua,YANG Xiu-tai.An Analysis of Government Involvement in Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2001,9(2):65-70.
Authors:XIANG Rui  CHAO Guo-hua  YANG Xiu-tai
Institution:Faculty of Business Adimnistration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
Abstract:In this paper,the model has been constructed corresponding to the present situation of corporate governance mechanisms in China.With game theory,it is proved that the efficiency in corporate operation will be affected seriously by the governance mechanism in which the Government is involved excessively.We consider that the Government should withdraw State-owned property from industries as soon as possible and it should be a most urgent task at present to eliminate barriers of property rights in reformed state-owned enterprises.
Keywords:corporate governance  agency problem  game-theoretic analysis  
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