| Abstract: | When a manufacturer relies solely on its own inputs in making products, the focus of negotiations between the manufacturer and retailer is exclusively on profits in the output (retail) market. In such cases, absent retail competition concerns, standard two‐part tariff negotiations set the per‐unit wholesale price equal to marginal cost, and require fixed transfers from the retailer to the manufacturer. In this article, we recognize that manufacturers often rely on imperfectly competitive markets for at least some inputs. Incorporating this seemingly natural feature has profound implications for manufacturer–retailer negotiations since it shifts their focus from being exclusively on output markets to one that balances strategic concerns in both input and output realms. The article's main result is that the added need to discipline input prices can lead the manufacturer and retailer to write contingent contracts that are cost‐plus and prescribe lump‐sum slotting allowances (i.e., fixed transfer from the manufacturer to the retailer). |
