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公共租赁住房体系运行资金来源问题研究
引用本文:王英,钟清,顾湘.公共租赁住房体系运行资金来源问题研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2012,18(4):16-22.
作者姓名:王英  钟清  顾湘
作者单位:重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“公共租赁住房运行机制研究”(10YJC630060)
摘    要:公共租赁住房(下文简称"公租房")是满足城市中等偏下收入家庭基本住房需求的社会保障性住房。文章对公租房运行过程中存在的一大难题——资金来源问题进行研究,通过建立博弈模型分析涉及公租房建设的各行为主体间的利益关系,找出优化其预期行为的最优均衡,然后根据达到该最优均衡所需的条件设计出相应的激励约束机制,将各行为主体可能作出的理性决策引导至有利民生的方向。

关 键 词:公租房  利益博弈  激励约束机制设计

Research on the Issue of Funding Sources in the Operation of Public Rental Housing
WANG Ying,ZHONG Qing and GU Xiang.Research on the Issue of Funding Sources in the Operation of Public Rental Housing[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Social Sciences Edition),2012,18(4):16-22.
Authors:WANG Ying  ZHONG Qing and GU Xiang
Institution:(School of Construction Management and Real Estate,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,P.R.China)
Abstract:Public rental housing is the social security housing which is used to meet the basic housing needs of the urban lower-middle income families.The issue of funding sources is an important problem in the operation of public rental housing,which will be studied in this paper.In the research process,the authors create game model,analyze the interest relationship between the actors involved in public rental housing,find the optimal balance,and then design the incentive and restrictive mechanism according to the conditions by which the optimal balance can be achieved,lead the actors’ rational decisions to a direction on which it is beneficial to the people’s livelihood.
Keywords:public rental housing  interest game  incentive and restrictive mechanism design
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