尼克松政府1971年联合国中国代表权之失

本文主要讨论美国尼克松政府时期关于联合国中国代表权问题的决策环境、过程和模式。尼克松总统从一开始就没有把联合国中国代表权问题放在优先考虑的位置上,实际上,他直到1970年底才真正认真加以考虑。他和他的国家安全事务助理基辛格博士构成了决策核心,并对该问题进行了战略放弃;同时又对长期负责该事务的国务院系统和国务卿罗杰斯毫不信任,从而造成严重的信息脱节以及其他一系列的战术失误,使得美国最终在1971年失掉了对联合国中国代表权的主导地位。在一批新近解密的美国国家安全档案的帮助下,本文对于这次美国在联合国失利的原因和影响进行了分析,发现了决策过程中的若干关键因素,并构建了该问题决策的陀螺模型。

The Fall of the Peg-top:the Failure in the U.N.Chinese Representation Policy of the Nixon Administration in 1971

This article addresses the topic of the decision-making context, progress and model of U.S. policy on the Chinese representation issue in the U.N. during the Nixon presidency. President Nixon did not consider the Chinese representation issue in the U.N. as a priority. It was not until November 1970, that he took part in making the U.N. policy. He and Dr. Henry Kissinger, the assistant for National Security Affairs, formed the core in decision-making. Vis--vis the détente with Mainland China, Nixon and Kissinger gave up the Taiwan seat issue strategically. They did not trust the State Department and its Secretary, William Rogers, so a terrible lag of information transmission took place. A series of tactical mistakes resulted in the final failure. The newly available U.S. governmental documents from the Nixon administration shed new light on the understanding of that progress. Moreover, I conceive a peg-top model for the U.N. policy making in the Nixon White House.