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废弃共享单车回收治理的多主体博弈演化
引用本文:司红运,施建刚,吴光东,王欢明.废弃共享单车回收治理的多主体博弈演化[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2020,22(1):109-121.
作者姓名:司红运  施建刚  吴光东  王欢明
作者单位:1. 同济大学 经济与管理学院, 上海 200092;
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目"面向绩效的市政公用事业网络策略与治理工具耦合机制研究"(71774023)
摘    要:随着共享单车在中国各城市的陆续投放,其产业链中下游的回收与转化问题已成为目前亟待解决的难题。借鉴国内外固体和电子电器废弃物回收经验,提出生产责任延伸制(EPR)与征收环保税两种回收治理模式,通过构建政府、企业和消费者的三方演化博弈模型并借助系统动力学仿真方法,对两种模式下废弃共享单车回收的多主体博弈治理过程进行模拟仿真,分析各方主体的演化均衡策略及最优治理路径。研究结果表明:三方主体最终将达到政府停止监管、企业选择生产责任延伸制模式、消费者参与回收的均衡状态;外生变量(消费者补贴、环保税和企业回收转化收益)对主体策略选择有显著的影响,且敏感程度依次增强。认为:在现阶段,政府在加强监管的同时需对共享单车企业强制实施生产者责任延伸制,使其承担产品从生产使用到废弃物回收处理等阶段所造成的资源和环境责任。单车企业则应通过提供免费骑行次数或提高个人信用等多样化激励方式引导消费者参与回收。

关 键 词:共享单车    废弃回收    协同治理    演化博弈    系统动力学
收稿时间:2019/2/17 0:00:00

The Evolution of Multi-agent Game in Recycling Governance of Waste Bike Sharing
SI Hongyun,SHI Jiangang,WU Guangdong and WANG Huanming.The Evolution of Multi-agent Game in Recycling Governance of Waste Bike Sharing[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2020,22(1):109-121.
Authors:SI Hongyun  SHI Jiangang  WU Guangdong and WANG Huanming
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China;2. School of Public Affairs, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;3. School of Public Administration and Law, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian Liaoning 116024, China
Abstract:With the launch of bike sharing in the major cities in China,the problem of recycling and conversion in the middle and lower reaches of the industrial chain has become a difficult problem to be addressed. This study aims to find out an appropriate governance path for increasingly waste shared-bicycles. The possible responses of stakeholders to the implementation of recycling scheme,such as environmental protection tax and extended producer responsibility,are investigated through evolutionary game theory. System dynamics approach is adopted to simulate the created game model. A case study of waste shared-bicycles in China is provided to demonstrate the application of the proposed model in which eight optional strategy profiles are examined. The results of the study show that the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state(the government stops supervision,the enterprise chooses the production responsibility extension model,and the consumers participate in the recovery); the exogenous variables (consumer subsidies,environmental protection tax and enterprise recovery conversion income) have significant impacts on the choice of subject strategy,and the sensitivity is increased in turn. The results of the study suggest that at this stage,the government needs to enforce the producer responsibility on bike sharing companies while strengthening supervision,so that it can bear the resources and environmental responsibility caused by the stage from product usage to waste recycling. Bike sharing companies should guide consumers to participate in recycling through diversified incentives such as providing free rides or increasing personal credit.
Keywords:bike sharing  waste & recycle  co-governance  trilateral game  system dynamics
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