高管权力、薪酬操控与债权人利益——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

人力资本是现代企业的关键资源，薪酬制度是发挥人力资本优势的主要激励手段。然而，薪酬制度往往会受到企业高管操控，对债权人利益造成负向影响。通过抽样选择，对2 209家进行联贷的上市公司研究发现：（1）当高级管理人员拥有较大决策权时，公司决策更易表现出独裁性特点，难以体现集体决策的多元化优势，经理人容易操控与自身相关的薪酬制度。（2）经理人权力可能提高决策失误率，引发企业绩效不稳定，导致企业信用评级走低，长期债务比例更高，而债权人也将要求公司提供更高的风险溢酬。（3）企业决定举债期限系以避免遭受破产清算危机为主要考量因素。

Senior Management Power，Payment Control and Creditors' Interests—Evidence from Listed Companies in China

Human capital is the key resource for modern companies,and compensation system is the main incentive tool to gain human capital advantage. However,compensation systems are often manipulated by senior executives and have a negative impact on the interests of creditors. This paper finds that,when senior executives have greater power because of their expert ability,their decision would be more dominative and fail to offer the diversification benefit of group decision. Therefore,senior executives can manipulate the payment system easily. Furthermore,senior executives power would increase the possibility of suffering wrong decisions and hurt the persistence of firm performance. It could deteriorate a firm''s credit rating and bond holders would require more premiums for taking higher risk. The decision of bond duration is associated with the tendency to reducing bankruptcy crisis.