政府参与下核证减排量质押融资演化博弈

碳资产质押融资对缓解中小控排企业融资难问题具有一定的积极作用。然而，企业骗贷行为、银行参与性不高等现实问题导致碳资产质押业务发展缓慢。针对此问题，引入政府的激励政策，构建企业-银行-交易中心演化博弈模型。以核证减排量（Certified Emission Reduction，CERs）为例，探索碳资产质押融资实现帕累托最优状态的路径，从多主体角度寻找有效激励措施。基于仿真结果分析得出以下结论:相较于单个主体参与意愿的变动，CERs质押融资中企业和交易中心双主体参与意愿的同时变动对银行参与意愿的影响最大；政府处罚措施对企业和交易中心合谋骗贷行为的产生具有抑制作用，且加强对合谋骗贷中企业的惩处力度能更快推动CERs质押融资市场的可持续发展；在市场发展初期，相较于无政府参与的情况，政府激励措施能有效提高银行的参与意愿，降低企业欺骗意愿，且风险补偿机制比风险分担机制能更有效地帮助市场实现帕累托最优状态。

CERs Pledge Financing Model with Government Intervention Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Carbon asset pledge financing model is vital to alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. However,the collusion between enterprises and carbon certification institutions has led to the lower participation of banks and the slow development of carbon assets pledge business. In view of the above problems,this paper introduces the government incentive policies and constructs the evolutionary game model of government-enterprise-bank-carbon trading center,and takes Certified Emission Reduction(CERs) as an example to explore the realization path of the Pareto optimal state of carbon asset pledge financing mechanism. The simulation experiments are conducted with meaningful results:compared with a single subject,the simultaneous change of the participation willingness of the enterprises and the carbon trading centers has the greatest influence on the participation willingness of the banks; the government''s penalties can restrain the conspiracy between the enterprises and the carbon trading center,and strengthening the punishment of enterprises in the collusion can promote the sustainable development of CERs pledge financing market faster; under government incentives,risk-compensation mechanism can help the market achieve Pareto optimal state more effectively than risk-sharing mechanism. Above conclusions can provide a theoretical basis for the development of Chinese Certified Emission Reduction(CCER) project and policy guidance for the carbon asset pledge financing market.