基准线法下企业最优碳减排和产品定价决策

基准线法是碳限额与交易制度中免费碳配额分配的常用方法之一，其实施关键是确定碳排放基准值，即企业所处行业单位产品碳排放量的平均值。假定有政府和企业两个决策体，政府作为领导者以社会福利最大化为决策目标，决策最优碳排放基准值；生产企业作为跟随者以利润最大化为决策目标，决策企业碳减排水平和产品定价。通过构建政府社会福利最大化与企业利润最大化斯坦伯格博弈模型，探讨基准线法下政府最优碳排放基准值设定、企业最优碳减排决策和产品定价策略。研究表明:政府最优碳排放基准值的设定与政府碳减排目标、未减排时单位产品的生产成本、碳排放量和环境影响正相关，与消费者低碳意识负相关。企业的最优碳减排水平决策和最优定价决策，主要受政府碳排放基准值、未减排时单位产品的环境影响成本和消费者低碳意识等因素影响。

Optimal Decisions of Carbon Emission Reduction and Production Pricing under Benchmarking Free Allocation of Carbon Permits

One of the commonly used modes for free carbon allocation permits in carbon cap and trade mechanism is benchmarking. For benchmarking mode,the key is to determine the optimal carbon emission per unit of product. This paper assumes that there are two decision-makers:the government and the enterprise. The government as a leader determines the optimal carbon emission value with the goal of social welfare maximization. Then the manufacturing enterprise as a follower determines the carbon emission reduction level and production pricing with the goal of profit maximization. By constructing a Stackelberg game model of maximizing government social welfare and maximizing enterprise profit,this paper discusses the setting of the government optimal carbon emission baseline and the decision of the enterprise optimal carbon emission reduction and production pricing.Results show that the government''s optimal carbon emission benchmark is increasing in the government''s carbon emission reduction target, the production cost per unit product, as well as the carbon emission and environmental impact when no emission reduction occurs. However, the benchmark is decreasing in consumers'' low carbon awareness. The enterprise''s optimal carbon emission reduction decision and product pricing decision are mainly affected by the government''s carbon emission benchmark, the environmental impact cost per unit product when no emission reduction occurs,as well as the low carbon awareness of consumers.