Tax morale and fairness in conflict an experiment |
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Affiliation: | 1. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany;2. Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, via Inama 5, 38127 Trento, Italy;3. School of Business and Management, LUT University, Yliopistonkatu 34, 53850 Lappeenranta, Finland |
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Abstract: | Most people pay their taxes most of the time, even if the expected disutility from enforcement is too low to deter tax evasion. One potential reason is tax morale and, more specifically, rule following. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes just because participants are told they are supposed to pay is indeed pronounced. Yet compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply. |
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Keywords: | Rule following Fairness Tax evasion Tax morale Heterogeneity Beliefs Path model C30 C91 D01 D02 D31 D63 D91 H26 K34 K42 2260 3660 2960 |
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