On signaling disability in anonymous economic games |
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| Institution: | 1. LESSAC and CEREN, EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business – Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Dijon, France;2. CEE-M, Montpellier SupAgro, INRA, CNRS, Université de Montpellier, Montpellier, France;3. Institut Régional Supérieur du Travail Éducatif et Social (IRTESS), Dijon, France |
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| Abstract: | We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed.Practitioner points:- •People interact in a positive way with disabled people.
- •Managers can be tempted to use strategically disabled people in organizational contexts.
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| Keywords: | Dictator game Ultimatum game Disability Fairness Generosity |
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