一元制公司治理结构下董事会的功能检视与再造

正值公司法修订草案引入一元制公司治理结构之际，重新检视董事会在中国公司治理中的角色定位与功能面向具有特殊的意义。面对监事会制度长期以来的形骸化现象与混合模式下出现的公司监管重叠与监管中空等现实问题，监督型董事会在中国公司代理权下沉现象普遍存在的背景中将应运而生。相比于传统董事会，监督型董事会以其在公司治理中的监督功能为核心，尤其在监事会缺省的一元制语境中更应作为公司内部监督机关而发挥作用。在保证主体独立性与对象全面性的基础上，新架构下的董事会将能实现监督的灵活性与深入性，宜建构强化弱势股东话语权的选任机制、保障监督主体抗衡力的行权机制、创新多元的激励机制与权责适应的追究机制，从而充分发挥董事会的监督功能，进而推动中国公司治理实践与现代公司制度的良性发展。

The Functional Review and Reconstruction of the Board of Directors under the Unitary Corporate Governance Structure

It is of special significance to re-examine the role and function of the board of directors in Chinese corporate governance when the unitary corporate governance structure is introduced in the revised draft of company law. Facing the long-term confusion of the board of supervisors system and the practical problems of overlapping and hollow supervision in the mixed mode, the Monitoring Board emerges in the background of the widespread phenomenon of agency sinking in China. Compared with the traditional board of directors, the Monitoring Board takes its supervision function as the core in corporate governance. Especially in the default of the board of supervisors system in unitary corporate governance structure, it plays a role as the supervision organ of the company. In the guarantee of the independence of the subject and the comprehensiveness of the object, the board of directors under the new structure will be able to achieve flexibility and depth of supervision. It is conducive to bringing into full play the supervision function of the board of directors to construct a selection and appointment mechanism to strengthen the voice of the vulnerable shareholders, an exercise of power mechanism to guarantee the rival power of the supervisory subject, an innovative and diversified incentive mechanism and an investigation mechanism consistent with power and responsibility, in order to promote the benign development of corporate governance practice and modern corporate system in China.