Britain's Colonial Emergencies and the Invisible Nationalists

Abstract From the perspective of imperial propaganda Britain's colonial emergencies of the forties and fifties have straightforward, even self-evident explanations. In the case of Malaya the state of emergency declared in June 1948 was a response to an international communist plot designed to seize power. In Kenya, an underground conspiracy of tribal extremists necessitated the implementation of emergency powers in October 1952 and the intervention of the British military. In British Guiana, the October 1953 state of emergency was essential to prevent a communist-inspired reign of terror and sabotage.¹
More objective researchers and journalists have questioned the familiar justification for Britain's colonial emergencies.² However, controversy persists, not simply about the interpretation of these events but about the basic facts.³ This is not surprising, because a study of the available files in the Public Records Office shows that the relationship between the colonial emergencies and their purported causes is far from straightforward. While imperial propaganda projected a sense of single-minded clarity, behind the scenes the leading experts of the Colonial Office were uncertain and deeply disturbed by events that they did not entirely comprehend. Nevertheless, despite their lack of a clear understanding of the situation in the affected colonies, the Colonial administration fully supported a military response. Indeed a study of the emergencies in Malaya, Kenya and British Guiana reveals a common pattern in the response of the British government and helps to place each of these conflicts in a wider perspective.