Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and Dictatorship |
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Authors: | Mori Osamu |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Warwick and GREQAM, Coventry, UK;(2) D?partement de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ, Universit? de Montr?al, Montr?al, Canada;(3) Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada |
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Abstract: | In this paper I investigate the possibility of a dictatorship in the context of Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem. Preliminarily, some propositions about Harsanyi's Theorem are presented using an alternative principle that I name Quasi-strong Pareto, which is the latter part of Strong Pareto. Then I define dictatorship as a requirement that social preference agrees with a dictator's preference or those of members of dictatorial group even if their preferences strictly contradict those of all other people in the society. Conclusively, although in each version of Harsanyi's Theorem with Pareto Indifference, Weak Preference Pareto or Weak Pareto the social utility function may have a form of dictatorship, however if individuals' vNM utility functions are all 'individualistic' and Quasi-strong Pareto is satisfied, then the dictatorship is excluded. |
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Keywords: | dictatorship Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem independent prospects Quasi-strong Pareto utilitarianism |
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