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网络融合下的产业交叉进入及企业横向兼并行为研究
引用本文:徐敏.网络融合下的产业交叉进入及企业横向兼并行为研究[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,19(3):104-110.
作者姓名:徐敏
作者单位:东南大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210096
摘    要:本文基于二阶段动态古诺竞争模型,考虑了通信产业网络运营商横向兼并前后边际成本的变化,研究存在n家运营商的同质产品市场中,企业进行横向兼并的条件,并对横向兼并所引起的运营商利润变化及社会福利的变化进行了探讨。结果表明,随着横向兼并后边际成本节约程度的增加,运营商利润和社会福利都会增大。本文尝试对在网络融合下,媒体交叉竞争、产品同质化的过程中,网络运营商之间横向兼并行为进行规范的经济学分析,有关结论可以为政府制定网络融合下通信产业重组的相关政策提供一定的理论依据。

关 键 词:网络融合  交叉竞争  横向兼并  古诺模型

Research on Cross-Industry Entrance and Horizontal Merger of Communication Industry under Network Convergence
XU MIN.Research on Cross-Industry Entrance and Horizontal Merger of Communication Industry under Network Convergence[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2009,19(3):104-110.
Authors:XU MIN
Institution:XU MIN (School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China)
Abstract:The paper researches on the conditions of the broadcasting and television networks merger in a homogeneity product market in which n operators exist, and probes into the changes in profits and social welfare arising from the horizontal merger. Networks merger reduces the marginal cost. The higher the level of savings is, there will be more operators' profits and greater increase in social welfare. For the first time the paper makes an economic analysis on the cross-industry entrance and horizontal merger in communication industry in network convergence.
Keywords:Networks Convergence  Cross-industry Entrance  Horizontal Merger  Dynamic Game
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