我国银行保险合作危机与最优手续费求解

与国外发达国家相比,我国银行保险还处于“分销协议”的初级阶段,保险公司支付给银行一定的手续费来实现产品的销售。用静态贝叶斯博弈模型计算出这个手续费的博弈均衡值,从理论上证明了当前银保合作手续费过高的事实。这是目前保险公司逐渐陷入该项业务利润大幅削减甚至亏损的被动局面、造成银行保险合作危机的原因。

The Crisis of Chinese Bank Insurance Cooperation and the Problems of Most Reasonable Service Charge to Be Solved

Compared with the developed countries abroad,Chinese bank insurance is in the initial stage of "retail agreement" in which an insurance company pays a bank service charge to promote the sale of its products.The model of the static Bayesian game calculates the game equilibrium value of service charge in order to show in theory that the current service charge for bank insurance cooperation is unreasonably high,which has provoked a heavy loss of profits and even deficits on the part of Chinese insurance companies.