基于多重委托-代理关系的规制俘虏模型研究

在政府对自然垄断企业的规制研究中,大多假设规制者是公众的代言人和国家利益的维护者,而在实际运作过程中,规制者还是一个自身效用最大化的追求者,这种双重身份有可能导致规制者利用自身的权力与受规制企业形成合谋,以便获取双方利益,从而产生规制俘虏问题,加重政府规制的不完备性。本文将在非对称信息条件下,运用多重委托-代理模型,对规制俘虏问题进行探讨,并根据模型分析的结论,提出相应的抑制手段。

Study of Regulatory Capture Models Based on Multiple Principal-Agent

In the studies of government regulation for natural monopoly enterprises,it is a basic assumption that the regulator looks like the public advocates and defenders of the national interest.In actual operation,the regulator also is a pursuer who wants to maximize his effectiveness.This double-identity might lead to the abuse of regulatory of power by collusion with the regulated enterprises so it is acquired the interests of both sides.This is the so-called regulatory capture issue which greatly increased the incompleteness of government regulation.This paper will discuss the problem using the multiple principal-agent models under the asymmetric information,and put up the corresponding restrictive means based on the conclusion of model analysis.