The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games |
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| Authors: | Yuan Ju Peter Borm Pieter Ruys |
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| Institution: | (1) School of Economic and Management Studies, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK;(2) CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands;(3) TILEC, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, and Tias Business School, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players.
This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations
of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the
other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value. |
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