MAKING THREATS: MINIMAL DETERRENCE,EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING*

This analysis contributes to a political sociology of the arms race by linking the history of U.S. strategic policy with sociological explorations in the organization of power. American nuclear policy illustrates continuity and episodic change. Continuity is expressed in near-universal support among policy-makers of a policy of “extended” rather than “minimal” deterrence. Extended deterrence implies a threat to use nuclear weapons first. The change in nuclear policy is the variation in the determination to modernize the nuclear force structure. That is, the actual commitment to prepare to fight and win a nuclear war oscillates from one period to another. Sustained efforts to improve the nuclear force structure have been concentrated in four periods: the Truman administration between 1947 and 1950, the first two years of the Kennedy administration, the last two years of the Nixon administration, and the last year of the Carter administration to the present. The determination to modernize the nuclear force structure is situated within intra-elite debates between advocates of containment and proponents of rollback, and the installation of new foreign policy projects necessary to adjust the position of the U.S. in the world arena.