消费者低碳偏好下的供应链收益共享契约研究

在消费者对低碳产品存在偏好并且企业自愿减排的假定下，探讨了在由单个供应商与单个零售商构成的两级供应链中零售商确定最佳订货水平和供应商选择减少碳排放水平的决策问题。研究发现单位产品碳排放过大时，供应商不会选择减排；当单位排放较低时，选择减排战略会改善供应商和零售商的收益状况，可以实现供应链成员收益的帕累托改进；而当单位排放处于两者之间时，选择减排战略会使供应商的收益状况变差，使零售商的收益和供应链总体收益增加，虽然存在着改善供应链渠道收益状况的空间，但供应商没有减排动力，减排无法实施。针对这一问题，本文设计了收益共享契约来协调两者之间的关系，实现了帕累托改进。最后，利用Rubinstein讨价还价模型来分析分成比例在给定区间确定问题。

Revenue-Sharing Contract of Supply Chain Based on Consumer’s Preference for Low Carbon Products

In the case where consumers prefer to low carbon products and the supplier reduces its carbon emissions voluntarily, the questions of how to determine the optimum order quantity and in which situation the supplier should choose to reduce carbon emission are investigated. In addition, profits of the retailer and the supplier between cases of the non-carbon reduction and the carbon reduction are compared. It can be found that if the carbon emissions per unit product is too high, the supplier will not choose the carbon reduction strategy; when the carbon emission per unit product is low enough, choosing carbon reduction strategy can present a Pareto improvement; when the carbon emissions per unit product between the former two, the supplier's profit status becomes worse, but both the retailer and the supply chain channel's profits improve. In this case, there is space for improving the supply chain channel's earning status, but the improvement can't be realized in the absence of the supplier's support. To solve this problem, a revenue-sharing contract for coordinating the supply chain is designed. With this contract, both the supplier and the retailer achieve the Pareto improvement. Finally, how to determine the revenue sharing ration is analyzed with the Rubinstein bargaining model.