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基于双层粒子群算法的上下游企业决策动态博弈
引用本文:杨广青,刘涛.基于双层粒子群算法的上下游企业决策动态博弈[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):152-160.
作者姓名:杨广青  刘涛
作者单位:福州大学管理学院, 福建 福州 350108
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702022);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJCZH243);福建省社会科学规划项目(2011B133);福建省软科学研究计划项目(2011R0059)
摘    要:在寡占市场结构下,企业决策的相互影响效应更为显著。此时,企业融资决策与产量决策不仅仅影响自身利润,而且会影响到其竞争对手和供应商,即企业决策的策略性效应。本文建立一个考虑产品替代性与市场环境波动内外因素的上下游企业决策动态博弈模型,针对该决策的非线性二层规划特点,设计了双层粒子群算法,并利用计算机模拟技术对企业决策进行分析。研究发现,第一,产品替代性对下游企业具有“竞争效应”,对上游企业生产与利润的下降具有“放大效应”,与债务融资有限责任效应相比,产品替代性的“竞争效应”对下游企业的产量博弈和利润影响更大,另外,债务有限责任效应与债务破产效应左右了产品替代性对下游企业破产均衡临界点的影响。第二,市场环境波动对企业产量决策和融资决策的影响与Wanzenried1]一致,而在影响下游企业利润和上游企业利润方面并不一致。第三,针对负债融资和无负债融资两种情形,不论产品替代性较低还是较高,较高的市场波动程度都能促使负债企业考虑债务的战略性作用,且下游企业的负债融资存在“Prisoner’s Dilemma”现象,上游企业的垄断市场地位则加强了下游企业负债融资“放大效应”对其利润的影响。

关 键 词:粒子群算法  战略性融资  古诺博弈  产品替代性  市场环境波动  
收稿时间:2012-07-19
修稿时间:2013-06-17

Dynamic Game of the Upstream and Downstream Business Decisions based on Duble-level Particle Swarm Optimization
YANG Guang-qing,LIU Tao.Dynamic Game of the Upstream and Downstream Business Decisions based on Duble-level Particle Swarm Optimization[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2013,21(6):152-160.
Authors:YANG Guang-qing  LIU Tao
Institution:School of Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China
Abstract:The mutual influence effect from the corporate decision-making is more significant in the oligopolistic market structure. At this point, the corporate finance decisions and output decisions not only affect their own profits, and will affect their competitors and suppliers, that is, the strategic effect of the business decisions. In this paper, the dynamic game model of the upstream-downstream business decisions is established with considering product substitution and market fluctuations. A double particle swarm algorithm against that decision of nonlinear bilevel programming features is designed. Then the enterprise decision-making is analyzed by using computer simulation technology. It can be found that, firstly, product substitution has a "competitive effect" on downstream enterprises and "amplifying effect" on the decline of production and profit of upstream enterprises. Compared with debt financing limited liability effect, the "competitive effect" of the product substitution have a greater impact on production game and profit of the downstream enterprises. In addition, debt limited liability effect and debt bankruptcy effect together affect the impact of product substitution on the bankruptcy equilibrium critical point of downstream enterprises. Secondly, the impact of fluctuations in the market environment on production decision-making and financing decision is consistent with Wanzenried1], but the impact on profit of upstream and downstream enterprises is not consistent. Finally, when considering the two cases of debt financing and no debt financing, regardless of lower or higher product substitution, a higher degree of fluctuations in the market environment urge the financing enterprises to consider the strategic role of debt, and the phenomenon of "Prisoner's Dilemma" exists in downstream enterprises' financing decisions. Upstream firm's monopoly position in the market strengthens the impact of the "amplifying effect" of debt financing for downstream enterprises on its profit.
Keywords:particle swarm optimization  strategic financing  cournot game  product substitution  the fluctuations in market environment  
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