国有土地拍卖机制研究

本文基于贝叶斯均衡上的执行问题，讨论了参与人参数环境空间受机制设计者影响时，不同机制选择的执行条件，给出了目标函数不变时机制对偶等价性的充分必要条件。并比较了中国国有土地拍卖三大机制的效率，给出了土地拍卖机制在实话实说可执行下对的社会福利影响，研究发现：当参与者可以策略性选择行动，实现政府利益最大时，选择限房价或者限地价机制是等价的；非市场机制和市场机制相比，关键还是土地财政和消费者利益之间的权衡；实话实说可执行机制直接显示了政府利益、开发商利润与消费者利益三者之间的权衡关系，但并未改进社会福利。

Land Auction in China

Different parameter space is discussed under the influence of the control variable chosen by the mechanism designer. The space would be different constraint to each agent and different mechanism has its implementation condition based on Bayesian equilibrium. The sufficient and necessary condition of dual equivalent mechanism is presented. As an application of this study, the efficiency and welfare of China's land auction mechanisms are compared under truth-telling implementation. The result shows that choosing limited housing price auction or limited land price auction was dual equivalent when the government revenue is maximized. The balance between the government revenue and consumer surplus depends on the comparison between the efficiency of the market mechanism and non-market mechanism. There is a tradeoff between the profit of developer and consumer surplus, but the social welfare cannot be improved by truth-telling implementation.