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投资政策不确定条件下的寡头发电容量投资分析
引用本文:张新华,叶泽. 投资政策不确定条件下的寡头发电容量投资分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(9): 26-32
作者姓名:张新华  叶泽
作者单位:长沙理工大学经济与管理学院, 湖南 长沙 410114
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271033,70971012);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0978)
摘    要:投资政策是影响发电容量投资策略的重要因素之一。论文运用实物期权理论,构建电力需求与投资政策双重不确定条件下的发电容量投资模型,在模型的求解与分析基础上,对两个投资阈值进行数值仿真分析,分析结果表明:(1)当投资补贴比率较低时,取消“投资补贴”政策预期越大,发电商越延迟其容量投资,而当补贴比率较高时则抢先投资,在“投资补贴”政策即将被取消时发电商投资积极性最大;(2)实施“投资补贴”政策预期越大,发电商越延迟其容量投资,在“投资补贴”政策即将实施时发电商尽最大可能延迟其投资。

关 键 词:实物期权  容量投资  政策不确定  电力市场  
收稿时间:2012-08-26
修稿时间:2013-01-23

Study on Oligopoly Power Producer’s Capacity Investment under Policy Uncertainty
ZHANG Xin-hua,YE Ze. Study on Oligopoly Power Producer’s Capacity Investment under Policy Uncertainty[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(9): 26-32
Authors:ZHANG Xin-hua  YE Ze
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management, Changsha University of Science and Tchnology, Changsha 410114, China
Abstract:Investment policy is a major element influencing capacity investment strategy,but is uncertain to power producers. In order to investigate the influence, a capacity investment model is proposed under demand and policy uncertainties based on real option theory. The model is solved, and the two investment thresholds are simulated with some basic data of existing literature numerically. The results indicate that power producer will delay investing if the ratio of subsidy is lower, and will preempt investing if the ratio of subsidy is higher, with higher expectation of cancelling investment subsidy, and the highest investment enthusiasm will appear when the subsidy will be cancelled immediately. Moreover, power producer will delay investing with larger possibility of implementing investment subsidy, and will delay investing as far as possible when the subsidy will be implemented immediately. The paper provides a theoretical way to explore the optimal investment policies in basic industries to some extent.
Keywords:real option  capacity investment  policy uncertainty  power market  
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