Positional independence in preference aggregation |
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Authors: | Antonio Quesada |
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Institution: | (1) Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo (Murcia), Spain. (e-mail address: qnio@um.es; Web page: http://www.um.es/analisiseco/prof/quesada/index.html), ES |
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Abstract: | If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting
social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more
complex” than just selecting an alternative from a list using a single criterion. This is because the information required
by non-dictatorial SWFs to aggregate preferences cannot be compressed into a CF. It is also shown that the attempt to reduce
the working of a SWF to the working of a CF involves the adoption of certain positional requirements, whose relationship with
the conditions in Arrow's theorem is established.
Received: 28 May 2001/Accepted: 25 March 2002
My deepest gratitude to Donald G. Saari, who rescued this paper from the worst fate, and to the referee, who showed the escape
route. |
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Keywords: | |
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