A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice |
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Authors: | Estelle Cantillon Antonio Rangel |
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Institution: | (1) Cowles Foundation, Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511, USA (e-mail: Estelle.Cantillon@yale.edu), US;(2) Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6072, USA (e-mail: rangel@leland.stanford.edu) and NBER, US |
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Abstract: | We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic
impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry
provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization
of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.
Received: 31 July 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2001 |
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Keywords: | |
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