家族企业委托-代理关系模型的修正研究

通过波特和劳勒的外在和内在奖酬激励理论对家族企业与职业经理人之间的委托-代理模型进行修正,旨在进一步合理化,完善家族企业与经理人之间的契约合同,为家族企业找到解决家族困境问题的办法提供新的思路。不仅将外在报酬激励因素带入模型,而且尝试将波特和劳勒激励理论中的内在报酬激励因素纳入家族企业与职业经理人之间委托-代理关系模型中加以研究,通过对委托-代理模型的分析和修正,得出强化内在奖酬激励因素能有效降低委托代理成本。

On the Modification of Trust-Agent Relations of Family Enterprises

This paper modifies the trust-agent model between family enterprises and professional managers through Port and Lawler's theory of exterior and interior incentive in order to find new solutions to the difficulties family enterprises find them in by further rationalizing and perfecting the contract between family enterprises and managers.In addition to extrinsic remuneration incentives,the intrinsic reward incentives in Port and Lawler's theory is also studied in the modified trust-agent model.By analyzing and modifying the model,it is concluded that trust-agent cost can be significantly reduced by strengthening the intrinsic reward incentives.