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| 风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 熊风华,从小宁,马泉.风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理分析[J].西南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,2(4):38-40. |
| 作者姓名： | 熊风华 从小宁 马泉 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 西南农业大学,经济管理学院,重庆,400716 2. 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆沙坪坝,400044 3. 国家开发银行,重庆分行,重庆渝中区,400010 |
| 摘 要： | 风险投资是一种高风险投资 ,为了控制投资风险 ,解决风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理问题是关键。分析了风险投资家与创业家之间的逆向选择和道德风险问题 ,探讨了风险企业的制度安排 ,指出有效的激励约束机制是提高风险投资效率的关键。 |
| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 委托代理 治理结构 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-5379(2004)04-0038-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年6月23日 |
ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VENTURE CAPITALIST AND THE ENTREPRENEUR |
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| XIONG Feng-hua,CONG Xiao-ning,MA Quan.ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VENTURE CAPITALIST AND THE ENTREPRENEUR[J].Journal of Southwest Agricultural University:Social Science Edition,2004,2(4):38-40. | |
| Authors: | XIONG Feng-hua CONG Xiao-ning MA Quan |
| Institution: | XIONG Feng-hua1,CONG Xiao-ning2,MA Quan3 |
| Abstract: | Venture investment is a heavily risky investment and the relations between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur have to be tackled carefully. This paper discusses the retrograde choice and the moral risk between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur and the institutional arrangement of the ventures. It is pointed out that an effective mechanism of prompting and commitment is the key for enhancing the efficiency for any venture investment. |
| Keywords: | venture capital principal-agent management system |
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