Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters |
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Authors: | Bezalel Peleg Hans Peters |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat-Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel;(2) Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | Voting problems with a continuum of voters and finitely many alternatives are considered. Since the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem persists in this model, we relax the non-manipulability requirement as follows: are there social choice functions (SCFs) such that for every profile of preferences there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the alternative assigned by the SCF? Such SCFs are called exactly and strongly consistent. The paper extends the work of Peleg (Econometrica 46:153–161, 1978a) and others. Specifically, a class of anonymous SCFs with the required property is characterized through blocking coefficients of alternatives and through associated effectivity functions. |
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