| MBO与国有企业经营者的激励及约束 |
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| 引用本文： | 张国宏. MBO与国有企业经营者的激励及约束[J]. 河南社会科学, 2005, 13(6): 68-71 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张国宏 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中科技大学,管理学院,湖北,武汉,430044 |
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| 摘 要： | MBO能够广泛推行具有一定的深层理论基础,其中委托代理理论、人力资本理论、激励理论和企业家理论都与此直接相关。通过MBO,管理者成为完全的剩余权益拥有者,可减少或消除代理成本,激励经理人积极性的发挥。通过MBO后管理层的努力-可将潜在管理效率释放出来,提高公司市场价值,获取更多利润。因此MBO能够有效地约束与激励管理层。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理层收购 国有企业 激励 约束 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-905X(2005)06-0068-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-20 |
MBO and the Restriction and Stimulation of the Operators in Stated Owned Enterprises |
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| Zhang Guohong. MBO and the Restriction and Stimulation of the Operators in Stated Owned Enterprises[J]. Henan Social Sciences, 2005, 13(6): 68-71 |
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| Authors: | Zhang Guohong |
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| Abstract: | The extensive practice of MBO has deep theoretical basis,including the theories of commission,capital,stimulation and enterpriser.Through MBO,a manager becomes a complete owner of the surplus value,which can eliminate or reduce the agency cost and stimulate managers.Through MBO,the potential efficiency of manager can be released,the market value can be improved and more excess profit can be obtained.So MBO can effectively restrict and encourage managers. |
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| Keywords: | MBO stated owned enterprise restriction stimulation |
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