EXTERNAL THREAT AND COLLECTIVE ACTION |
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| Authors: | EMERSON M S NIOU Guofu Tan |
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| Institution: | Professor of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. Phone 1-919-660-4307, Fax 1-919-660-4330, E-mail . From 2004–06 Professor of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.;Professor, Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 3620 S. Vermont Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90089. Phone 1-213-740-3520, Fax 1-213-740-8543, E-mail |
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| Abstract: | This article studies how players allocate their endowed resources between productive and conflictual activities in the context of rivalry between two groups. We show that the suboptimality and exploitation propositions established by Olson (1965) do not necessarily apply when external threat is endogenized. We also illustrate that it does not always pay to take an offensive stance. When competing with an offensive group, it might be better for members of a defensive group to remain defensive. Furthermore, in the context of rivalry between two groups, free riding can actually benefit everyone in the system. (JEL D70 , D74 ) |
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