Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case |
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Authors: | Haldun Evrenk |
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Institution: | (1) Economics, Suffolk University, 8 Ashburton Place, Boston, MA, USA |
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Abstract: | We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when candidates differ in their non-policy
characteristics (valence). If the voters’ policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function, and if the
voter density is unimodal and symmetric, then a unique, modulo symmetry, Local Nash Equilibrium exists under fairly plausible
conditions. The global Nash Equilibrium, however, exists when only one candidate has a valence advantage (or disadvantage) while the other two candidates have the same valence.
An earlier version of this paper appeared as an appendix to Chap. 4 in Evrenk (2004).
An erratum to this article can be found at |
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Keywords: | |
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