存在应收账款条件下中小企业不足额质押融资合同设计

债权融资合同和股权融资合同都存在经营者道德风险问题,与对称信息相比都尚存在效率改进的空间。针对此问题,在中小企业质押不足、存在应收账款的前提下,基于非对称信息博弈论给出了利用应收账款进行融资的"条件合同"。研究表明:与单纯的债权合同相比,"条件合同"能有效地减少中小企业谎报项目真实收益、将资金挪为它用投资更高风险项目的激励;与单纯的股权合同相比,"条件合同"能保证中小企业经营者付出更多的努力;进一步,"条件合同"是股权合同的严格帕累托改进,并且在一定条件下也是债权合同的严格帕累托改进。最后以一个算例说明了研究结论的有效性。

Deficiency Pledge Financing Contract Design with Accounts Receivable for SMEs

Managers' moral hazard problem exists in debt financing contracts and equity financing contracts so that efficiency improvement is available compared with symmetric information situation.For this problem,under the premise of the deficiency pledge of small and medium enterprises and existence of accounts receivable,the conditional financing contracts with accounts receivable are presented based on asymmetric information game theory.This research shows that the conditional financing contracts can effectively reduce small and medium enterprises lie about real project benefits and move capital for investment of higher risk projects compared with debt contracts,at the same time,the conditional financing contracts can ensure managers pay more efforts compared with equity contracts.Furthermore,the conditional financing contracts can achieve strict Pareto improvement of both the equity and debt contracts,but the latter is under certain conditions.At the end,an example is used to explain the effectiveness of research conclusions.