低碳背景下政府行为及供应链合作研发博弈分析

研究了在低碳化背景下,考虑政府征收碳税的纵向供应链最优减排问题。通过建立供应链无减排研发、单独减排研发以及合作减排研发三种模型,采用逆向求解法,首先制造商制定最优减排量,然后供应链参与者决定各自的价格并得到各自的最优利润。通过对均衡结果分析得出,供应链合作研发的最优减排量大于单独研发最优减排量;供应链最优减排量与研发成本系数成负向关系,与分担比例成正向关系。最后用数值分析法证明了,制定合理碳税税率不仅促使最优减排量达到最大值,并且有利于供应链合作减排研发。最后联系实际为政府制定合理碳税税率,以及企业如何实现节能减排供应链协调提出了建议。

The Game Analysis of the Supply Chain Cooperative R & D and the Government's Behavior under the Low-carbon Background

In the background of low-carbon,study the optimal emission reductions for vertical supply chain with a carbon tax levied by the Government. Through the three models of no reduction of R & D、manufacturer's reduction of R & D alone and cooperation reduction,the converse method is used to solve this problem.By this method,firstly the decision is made by the manufacturer on the optimal emission reductions;then the price of products as set by the supplier and the manufactarer respectively and then their own optimal profits are gained. Through the analysis of equilibrium,It's found that the optimal emission reductions under the supply chain's cooperation R & D is more than that by manufacturer's reduction alone;The optimal emission reductions have a negative relationship with R & D cost coefficient,and a positive relationship with share proportion.At last,a numerical analysis proves that the reasonable carbon tax rates not only maximize the emission reductions, but also is conducive to supply chain's cooperative reductions of R & D.