Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems |
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Authors: | Youngsub Chun |
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Institution: | (1) Division of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea (e-mail: ychun@plaza.snu.ac.kr), KR |
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Abstract: | A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover
the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between
various axioms in this context. They are: agreement, separability, population solidarity, consistency, converse consistency, and population-and-cost solidarity. Also, on the basis of these axioms, we present alternative characterizations of egalitarian solutions; each solution assigns
to each agent an equal share of the surplus derived from the public project over some reference utility level, but uses a
different method to compute the reference utility level.
Received: 18 May 1998/Accepted: 1 July 1999 |
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