REGULATION VIA THREATS: POLITICS, MEDIA COVERAGE, AND OIL PRICING DECISIONS

Using the oil crisis of the late 1970s as a case study, we examine,the intertwined influences of public opinion and media attentionon the credibility of regulatory threats. We focus on threefactors: the intensity of public demands for regulatory intervention,the extent to which there are other competing demands on legislativeattention, and the availability of scapegoats external to theindustry. We use television news coverage of various topicsto measure these three factors. We hypothesize that firms threatenedwith potential regulation restrained price increases, with thelargest and most publicly visible firms exercising the greatestrestraint. We find that large, visible oil firms restrainedprice increases for the most important decontrolled prodicts(diesel fuel oil) when media coverage of the oil industry wasextensive. These firms exercised less restraint when the governmentwas busy with other issues or when political instability inthe Middle East offered an external rationale for oil priceincreases.