Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized |
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| Authors: | John Duggan Thomas Schwartz |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA (e-mail: dugg@troi.cc.rochester.edu), US;(2) Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA, US |
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| Abstract: | The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly
shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no
limit on ties or beliefs about them.
Received: 15 December 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998 |
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