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非合作状态下制造商与垄断供应商之间的谈判博弈研究
引用本文:郑锦荣,徐福缘. 非合作状态下制造商与垄断供应商之间的谈判博弈研究[J]. 管理学报, 2010, 7(3)
作者姓名:郑锦荣  徐福缘
作者单位:1. 上海海洋大学经济管理学院
2. 上海理工大学管理学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目,上海市第3期重点学科资助项目 
摘    要:通过构造一个2级供应链,建立了垄断供应商和制造商在非合作状态下的博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法求出了垄断供应商和制造商的非合作均衡解,并证明了垄断供应商优先选择生产成本低的制造商作为谈判对象.同时,提出了制造商之间的技术实力差距对非合作均衡态的影响,如果2个制造商之间的技术实力相差悬殊,市场将出现比较稳定的非合作均衡现象,如果技术实力接近,将出现争夺谈判权的博弈现象.

关 键 词:制造商  垄断供应商  非合作博弈  贴现  逆向归纳法

Negotiation Game between Manufacturers and Monopoly Supplier Under Non-cooperation State
ZHENG Jinrong,XU Fuyuan. Negotiation Game between Manufacturers and Monopoly Supplier Under Non-cooperation State[J]. Chinese JOurnal of Management, 2010, 7(3)
Authors:ZHENG Jinrong  XU Fuyuan
Abstract:We set up a two-stage supply chain and raise the negotiation game models between monopoly supplier and manufacturers under non-cooperation state. By backward induction method, we solve the equilibrium solutions of monopoly supplier and manufacturers. We prove that monopoly supplier prefer to choose manufacturers with low production cost to negotiates with. Meanwhile, we also analyze the influence of manufacturers' technical efficiency difference on non-cooperation equilibrium state. If the technical efficiency difference of two manufacturers is disparate, the market will appear the stable non-cooperation equilibrium state. If the technical efficiency difference is close, manufacturers will contest the right of negotiation with monopoly supplier in the short -term.
Keywords:manufacturer  monopoly supplier  non-cooperation game  discount  backward induction
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