双重委托代理、股东优势与管理层激励契约--对食品类上市公司的实证研究

针对近期频发的食品安全事件，提炼了食品企业治理机制的双重任务、双重委托代理与股东优势三大特征，并构建了双重委托代理模型，探析对管理者的激励契约设计，并使用食品类上市公司的面板数据进行了实证检验。研究表明：食品企业普遍建立了与财务绩效相联系的薪酬激励机制；政府监管机构尚未对食品企业建立与安全绩效相关的正向激励机制；股东优势的存在，会降低股东激励系数变化幅度，增大政府监管机构负向激励系数变化幅度。

Double Principal-Agent,Shareholder Superiority and Incentive Contract Design-Empirical Study Based on Food Listed Companies

In relation to recent food safety incidents ,we refined three features of corporate governance in food listed companies ：double task ,double principal-agent and shareholder superiority .We have developed a double principal-agent model analyzing the optimal incentive contract equilibrium conditions ,and made an empirical test with the panel data of food listed companies .The results show that food listed companies generally have established pay incentives mechanisms related to financial performance ,but the government has not established positive incentive mechanisms associated with food safety control .Shareholder superiority can decrease the magnitude of changes of shareholder positive incentive coefficient and increase the magnitude of changes of negative incentive coefficient of government regulators .