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Choice correspondences for public goods
Authors:Bettina Klaus  Ton Storcken
Institution:(1) University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Department of Economics, 340 College of Business Administration, Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA (e-mail: bklaus1@unl.edu), US;(2) Maastricht University, Department of Quantitative Economics, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands (e-mail: t.storcken@ke.unimaas.nl), NL
Abstract:We consider collective choice problems where a group of agents has to decide on the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. A well-known solution for such problems is the coordinatewise median of the reported votes and additional fixed ballots. Instead of adding ballots, we extend the median solution by allowing set-valued outcomes. This especially applies for location problems with an even number of agents. Received: 14 August 1998/Accepted: 29 August 2000
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