产品组合竞争下远视互补品供应商联盟的稳定结构

考虑由4个远视供应商与1个零售商所组成的两层供应链系统,基于最大一致集的概念,探讨部分供应商可替代时互补品联合销售联盟的远视稳定结构。研究发现:当供应商的成本相差较小时,如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较小,则远视供应商会偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商;如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较大,则远视供应商会偏好形成一个由3个供应商联合销售的大联盟。当供应商的成本相差较大时,远视供应商会偏好形成联合销售的大联盟,或者偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商。但是,两个供应商形成的联合销售联盟不是远视稳定的。

Stable Structure of Coalitions with Farsighted Suppliers of Complementary Components under Competing Retail Product Portfolio

Consider a two-echelon supply chain system consisting of four complementary products of farsighted suppliers A,1,2 and C and a single retailer.Based on the concept of the largest consistent set(LCS),we explore the farsighted stable structure of the joint selling coalition,in which some of suppliers are replaceable each other.The results show that:with less costs difference between the suppliers,farsighted suppliers would prefer to sell separately to the downstream retailers where the competition of two types of product portfolios is less intense.On the other hand,if the intensity of retail competition between the two product portfolios is high,the farsighted suppliers would prefer to form a large alliance of three suppliers selling jointly.In addition,when the cost difference between suppliers is large,farsighted suppliers would prefer to form a joint selling grand coalition or sell them individually to downstream retailer.However,the joint sales coalition formed by two suppliers is not farsighted stability.