Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces |
| |
Authors: | W Peremans H Peters H v d Stel T Storcken |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands, NL;(2) Department of Economics, Limburg University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, NL |
| |
Abstract: | In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever
it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices
are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a voting scheme is strategy-proof if and only if (α) its range is a closed
Cartesian subset of Euclidean space, (β) the outcomes are at a minimal distance to the outcome under a specific coordinatewise
veto voting scheme, and (γ) it satisfies some monotonicity properties. Neither continuity nor decomposability is implied by
strategy-proofness, but these are satisfied if we additionally impose Pareto-optimality or unanimity.
Received: 18 October 1993/Accepted: 2 February 1996 |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|