生产能力储备模式下应急物资储备与采购定价模型

为更好地促进政企双方开展应急物资生产能力储备合作,政府和协议企业需对物资的采购定价及生产能力的储备数量进行合理决策。基于此,文章从供应链的角度出发,利用供应链契约中的数量柔性契约建立了生产能力储备模式下的应急物资储备与采购定价模型,并进一步考虑了协议企业存在储备约束的情况。在利用逆序归纳法求解出合作下企业的生产能力储备量及相应的政府采购定价决策后,文章进一步分析了储备周期内灾害事件的发生概率与企业最大储备量约束对双方决策及各自成本收益的影响,为政府的采购定价及企业的储备策略提供了科学依据。此外,文章还给出了约束双方决策时的参数条件,因而也为政府在目标企业的选择方面提供了参考。

The model of emergency supplies storing and purchase pricing based on production capacity reserve

In recent years,frequent sudden disasters have caused huge economic losses and casualties to our country,which puts forward higher requirements and great challenges for emergency rescue work.In order to rescue timely affected areas after disasters,it is particularly important to strengthen the procurement and reserve management of emergency supplies.At the present stage,physical reserve method is the main way to store emergency supplies.Although the timeliness and security level of this reserve mode is relatively high,the reserve variety and the quantity are often too small to meet governments′disaster relief needs because of its high reserve cost,and it is necessary to maintain and manage supplies periodically,which occupies a large amount of financial funds.To solve the problem,the state calls on all levels of governments actively to cooperate with emergency supply production enterprises to carry out the production capacity reserve of emergency supplies.However,the cooperation effect is not ideal in reality mainly because of the lack of provisions on the purchase price of supplies in the process of cooperation.In the absence of institutional guarantee,on the one hand,it is difficult for the enterprises to decide whether to cooperate with the governments and how much production capacity should be reserved after cooperation.On the other hand,too low or too high procurement prices can damage the governments′interests and sometimes lead to corruption.Therefore,it is difficult for them to establish a normal cooperative relationship.In addition,at the present stage,the research on production capacity reserve of emergency supplies focuses on its advantages and disadvantages,applicability and so on,lacking of the decision-making of the quantity of production capacity reserve and procurement pricing,which cannot provide theoretical support for the decision-making of both sides.In view of the similarity between emergency supplies and general commercial supplies in the perspective of supply chain,the paper studies the problem of reserve quantity and pricing under the mode of emergency supply production capacity reserve from the perspective of supply chain.On this basis,a quantity flexible contract is used to construct the cooperation relationship between a government and an enterprise.This is mainly because the contract can give a purchaser the right(not the obligation)to purchase any quantity of supplies(not exceeding the agreed quantity)according to the pre-agreed price,it can effectively improve the ability of the government to deal with the uncertainty of supply demand.After building and analyzing the model of the related problem,the paper takes the maximization of the enterprise′s profit and the minimization of the government′s procurement cost as their decision-making objectives,and uses the inverse derivation method to solve the optimal decision-making of both the government and the enterprise.It is found that the probability of sudden disasters in the reserve cycle and the maximum reserve quantity of the agreed enterprise have a significant impact on the decision-making of both sides.What′s more,the paper further analyzes the impact of these two factors on the government′s cost and the enterprise′s profit.Finally,the conclusions are validated by numerical model.Therefore,the paper can provide a scientific basis for decision-making between governments and enterprises under cooperation.Specifically,the paper draws the following important conclusions and management enlightenment:(1)The decision-making of optimal production capacity reserve quantity of the contractual enterprise is mainly influenced by the probability of sudden disasters in the reserve cycle and the government′s pricing.Only when a disaster happens will the government purchase supplies from the enterprise.Consequently,when the probability of disasters in the reserve cycle and the government procurement price are high at the same time,the enterprise will cooperate with the government to reserve production capacity,Otherwise,he will refuse to cooperate because of the fear that the cost of supplies reserved cannot be compensated,which reflects the necessity of considering the probability of disasters.In conclusion,the paper provides support for enterprises′decision-making of reserve quantity under the cooperation.(2)When the decision-making between the government and the enterprise reaches equilibrium state,with the probability of disasters increasing,the probability of the government′s flexible procurement also increases.At this time,even if the government procurement price is low,the cost incurred by the enterprise for reserving production capacity can be compensated.Therefore,the government can lower the purchase price.Meanwhile,the reduction of purchase price will not cause the enterprise to reduce the reserve quantity.However,with the probability of government′s flexible procurement increasing,the enterprise will reserve more production capacity to increase his profit.Therefore,governments can provide enterprises with lower procurement price in areas with high incidence of disasters,and enterprises should not reduce their reserve quantity because of lower procurement prices.Instead,they should actively cooperate with governments and reserve more to improve their own profits.(3)Restricted by capital and warehousing,enterprises also have the upper limit of production capacity reserve.Therefore,the paper also considers the impact of the maximum reserve quantity of the enterprise on the decision-making and cost-benefit of the government and the enterprise,and gives the parameter conditions of constraining their decisions,which can help the government to select the target enterprise.That is to say,governments should select the enterprises whose maximum reserve quantity exceed the critical value as the target enterprises in areas with high probability of disasters.In addition,enterprises′profit increases with their maximum reserve quantity increasing,so they should strive to expand their scale.