IT服务外包项目工期与费用控制的 多属性英氏逆拍卖机制

工期和费用是影响IT服务外包项目成败的两个重要因素,且两者之间呈负相关的关系。在IT服务外包项目执行前,发包方与接包方需要就项目的工期和费用达成一致。通常,发包方并不完全了解外包项目的市场行情,在这种情况下,就需要一种有效的方式使发包方和接包方之间就工期和费用达成一致。本文设计了改进的英氏逆拍卖机制,针对一对多的情况设计了新的拍卖协议;针对工期和费用的多属性情况,引入多属性效用理论解决,设计了相应的效用增加函数。最后通过一个算例来演示所设计的拍卖机制对解决此类决策问题的作用。得出一些结论:所设计机制能够以拍卖方式描述费用和工期管理流程;找到了发包方和接包方的最佳增量效用,并且建议的拍卖协议是发包方和接包方获得双赢结果的机制;从不同大小的案例中可以得到完全一致的结果,这表明设计的拍卖机制的有效性和效用增加函数对协商结果的有效性。

Multi-attribute english reverse auction mechanism for schedule and cost control of IT outsourcing project

The enterprise separates its IT business and outsources to the external professional IT service provider,which is the vendor.The enterprise,as the client,selects the appropriate vendor through the auction to cooperate.Schedule and cost are the key factors for the success of IT outsourcing project,and the client and the vendors have a relatively negative preference relationship.The client and vendors should make an agreement on the schedule and cost before the start of the project.Generally,client does not know much about the market quotation and the ability of vendors.So an efficient approach is needed to select a better vendor for the project with balanced cost and schedule.In addition,the vendors also need to maximize its utility while maximizing its own competitiveness and cooperation with the client.In order to solve this problem,this paper starts to research.This paper designs a new british reverse auction mechanism for one-to-many markets.The auction mechanism stipulates the interaction rules and processes of both parties,which is the core of the whole auction theory;the client issues the minimum utility value,and the vendors update the utility value according to the utility increase function based on the minimum utility value,and the client selects the highest utility value,which is used as the new round of the lowest utility value,and the vendors continue to update the utility value until it reaches its maximum utility value and exits the auction.Finally,the remaining one of the vendor becomes the auction winner,and the price and delivery date he gave as the transaction price and the delivery date.According to the multi-attribute of schedule and cost,the utility theory of multi-attribute is introduced,and the utility evaluation function of the client and vendor is designed.Firstly,the corresponding evaluation function is designed for different attributes,and then the normalization method is used to give the evaluation function of each attribute.And the price and delivery date attributes are fee type for the client and effective for the vendors.In order to maximize the benefits of the vendor when the cost and schedule are given,the generating model of the vendor is designed.It is to maximize its utility in meeting the minimum utility requirements of the current round of the client and the attributes specified by both parties.According to the utility update of the vendor in each round of auction,a corresponding utility increase function is designed.This function stipulates that the utility increment of the vendors cannot be less than the minimum utility increment agreed by both parties,so as to ensure that the auction can be completed within a limited time,and the utility increase function is divided into a positive utility increase function and a negative utility increase function.Finally,a case addressing cost and schedule management issues in IT outsourcing projects is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the auction mechanism.In this case,a round of auction and multiple rounds of auction are discussed.In a round of auction,the vendor directly provides the maximum utility value it can provide,and the client selects the vendor with the largest utility value as the winner of the auction.In multiple rounds of auction,it can be divided into two cases:the vendor has the same utility increase function and the vendor has different utility increase function,each vendor gives the utility value of each round according to the utility increasing function,and when the maximum utility it can provide is reached,the vendor quits the auction.When the vendor has different utility increasing functions,the sensitivity analysis of the utility increasing function is carried out,and the result shows that its value will not affect the final result,which proves the stability of the auction result.In order to avoid the contingency of the results,two cases of 4 vendors and 10 vendors were designed,and the consistency of the research results was verified through a larger number of cases of vendors.The analysis results show in the case of a round of auctions and multiple rounds of auctions,the auction winner is the same person.In the case that the receiving party has the same utility increase function and different utility increase functions,the auction winner is also the same person,and the winner is the one who can provide the maximum utility value.The case proves the effectiveness of the auction mechanism.The designed mechanism can help the client select the best vendor for project cooperation effectively and quickly without knowing the vendors.By comparing the auction cases with 4 and 10 vendors,it proves that the utility of the winner will increase when the vendor has different utility increase functions.Therefore,it is suggested that the vendor should actively increase the utility in each round of auction.The negotiation model under the auction mechanism designed in this paper protects not only the benefits of the client but also the interests of the vendors.