航空公司交叉持股对产能共享策略的影响研究

产能共享与交叉持股是航空公司常用的运作与财务策略,两种方式都能在一定条件下起到缓和竞争的作用。本文考虑两家航空公司的两种交叉持股模式,构建了包含顾客忠诚度的价格竞争模型,依据产能是否对称以及是否实施产能共享策略形成八种不同的情形,求解并分析了不同情形下的最优价格决策及对应期望利润。通过对比不同情形下的利润,本文发现,在单向持股模式下,当产能对称时,两家企业始终愿意采用产能共享策略,而当产能不对称时,如果存在产能共享,产能较小的企业将更愿意降低产品价格,导致市场竞争加剧,从而损害产能较大企业的盈利能力。因此,只有当持股比例相对较小时企业才愿意实施共享产能策略。在交叉持股模式下,当产能对称时,企业在交叉持股比例适中时才愿意实施产能共享策略。而当产能不对称时,企业始终不愿意采用产能共享策略。这也表明产能共享和交叉持股策略之间存在一定的相互替代作用,企业应根据不同市场状态协调使用两种策略。

The effect of cross holding between airlines on capacity sharing strategy

With the development of economic globalization,cross-regional social and economic activities are becoming more frequent,airlines around the world have ushered in tremendous development opportunities.However,due to the dual nature of product homogenization and low marginal cost of air transport services,competition among airlines has become increasingly fierce.Capacity sharing and cross-holding are common operational and financial strategies of airlines,both of which can alleviate competition under certain conditions.In the capacity sharing strategy,the sharing of aircraft seats can be achieved between two competing airlines,that is,an airline′s capacity is insufficient to cover its own customers,and it can purchase capacity from another airline to make up for part of the customers that cannot be covered.Cross holding refers to the situation in which one firm holds shares in another firm,and two firms holding shares in each other is called partial cross holding.Based on the positive impact of cross-holding and capacity sharing on airlines,it has important practical significance to study the impact of capacity sharing strategies under cross-holding conditions on company revenue.This is actually a strategic decision of the company′s optimal operation and financial portfolio.Most of the existing literatures only discuss how the capacity sharing strategy can more accurately match supply and demand from the perspective of operation,or simply discuss the impact of cross holding financial strategy on corporate competitive behavior from the perspective of economics.Different from the previous literatures,this paper originally couples operational management strategy and financial strategy in the same model to study the interaction between two types of strategies.We study the joint decision-making of the company on cross-holding and capacity sharing between the two cross-holding airlines.In addition to this,the paper also considers the impact of symmetry of capacity on the optimal strategy in the market.This article assumes that there are two competing airlines,A and B,selling a substitutable service to some potential buyers in the market.Considering the two cross-holding modes of two airlines,this paper constructs a price competition model containing customer loyalty,eight different scenarios are constructed according to whether the capacity is symmetric and whether the capacity sharing strategy is implemented.In the paper,consider the scenario when firm A charges a lower price than firm B does.Both firm A′s loyal buyers and the switchers prefer to buy from firm A.However,due to limited capacity,some of them would be rationed and cannot buy immediately from firm A.If there is no capacity sharing between the two firms,the rationed A′s loyal buyers would leave the market without purchase,and the rationed switchers can go to the higher-priced firm B to buy the product.If there is voluntary capacity sharing between the two competing firms,the firm with stock-out can purchase the other firm′s residual capacity to satisfy its residual demand.Based on a mixed strategy game model,we then analyze the optimal price decision and the corresponding expected profit under different circumstances.By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium of different markets,we obtain the following conclusions:(1)In bilateral holding,when the capacity is symmetric,two companies are always willing to adopt the capacity sharing strategy.(2)In bilateral holding,when the capacity is asymmetric,if there is a sharing capacity,firm with smaller capacity will be more willing to lower the price in the market competition,which damages the profitability of the firm with larger capacity.Therefore,when the cross-holding ratio is relatively small,the airline holding the shares of the other side is more inclined to choose capacity sharing,and when the cross-holding ratio is high,the airline holding the shares of the other side will no longer adopt the capacity sharing strategy.For the airline that the other side holds its shares,whether or not to choose a capacity sharing strategy has no impact on its profit in this scenario.(3)Under the cross-holding model,when capacity is symmetric,firms are willing to implement the capacity sharing strategy only when the cross-holding ratio is moderate.And when the cross-holding ratio is too high or too low,both airlines are reluctant to adopt a capacity sharing strategy.(4)Under the cross-holding model,when the capacity is asymmetric,firms are always reluctant to adopt the capacity sharing strategy.Overall,our findings provide valuable insights on whether or not the two airlines with cross-holding adopt a capacity sharing strategy.This also shows that there is a certain substitution between capacity sharing and cross-holding strategies,and firms should coordinate the use of the two strategies according to different market conditions.