The backfiring effect of auditing on tax compliance |
| |
Institution: | 1. Department of Accounting, VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Austria;1. Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”, University of Turin & Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy;2. Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management & Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University, Italy;3. Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education, and Applied Psychology, University of Padua, Italy;4. Department of Management and Technology & Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University, Italy;1. School of Business, ADA University, 11 Ahmadbey Aghaoglu, AZ 1008 Baku, Azerbaijan;2. CentER and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;1. IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Italy;2. University of Salerno, Italy;3. University of Urbino, Italy;1. University of Vienna, Faculty of Psychology, Institute of Applied Psychology: Work, Education and Economy, Universitaetsstrasse 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria;2. University of Trento, CEEL – Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Via Calepina, 14, 38122 Trento, Italy;1. Department of Economics, Management, and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan, Italy;2. Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Austria;3. Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | Using country-level data from 2003–2014, we examine the association between auditing level (measured as number of verification actions taken by tax authorities per 100 taxpayers in each country) and tax compliance (measured as business executives’ perception of tax evasion). Our hypothesis is that compliance increases until a certain auditing level is reached, and decreases beyond that level (i.e., an elevated auditing level backfires). In line with our expectation, the results of a series of tests indicate that there is a U-shaped association between auditing and tax evasion. We discuss how a potential backfiring effect may depend on the extent to which compliance is voluntary. |
| |
Keywords: | Tax compliance Auditing Tax enforcement |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|